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ABSTRACT
Besides the evolution of the concept of national identity through the work of scholars, a new era 
in the conceptualization of this concept came with the Lisbon Treaty and its so-called ‘’national 
identity clause’’ or the famous Article 4(2) TEU. Since Article 4(2) TEU does not determine 
the national identity of Member States, in order to determine it, our starting point should be 
its constitution, or, more precisely, certain principles of its constitution or a set of core values, 
principles and rules. A second important phase in this sense is the relevant constitutional court’s 
case law. In this context, particularly important role play decisions regarding the relationship 
between the law of the European Union and domestic constitutional law. The German Federal 
Constitutional Court has developed the most elaborate jurisprudence on constitutional iden-
tity. This German approach has inspired the positions adopted by some other constitutional 
courts, and very possible will be aslo inspiration for future Croatian Constitutional Court 
position in this context. As it arises from the analysis of the CJEU’s case-law, although it seems 
that Article 4(2) TEU offers a trap door to Member States to escape some of their EU law 
obligations, the overall picture is far from being so simple.
Keywords: national identity, constitutional identity, constitutional court, Court of Justice of 
the European Union
1. INTRODUCTION
Although the idea of national identity is far from being new,1 it is well known that 
especially in the last few years ‘’national identity’’ is really á la mode.2 And yet, 
1  Moreover, constitutional theorizing about identity has really deep historical roots. As G. J. Jacobsohn em-
phasises, ‘’In Book III of The Politics Aristotle asked, ‘’On what principle ought we to say that a State has 
retained its identity, or, conversely, that it has lost its identity and become a different State?’’ His answer 
requires that we distinguish the physical identity of a state from its real identity, Thus, ‘The identity of a 
polis is not constituted by its walls.’ Instead, it is constituted by it constitution, which for Aristotle refers 
to the particular distribution of the offices in a polis – what the moderns imply by sovereign authority – as 
well as the specific end toward which the community aspires.’’ Jacobsohn, G. J., Constitutional Identity, 
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England, 2010, p. 7.
2  Claes, M., National Identity: Trump Card or Up for Negotiation, in: A. Saiz Arnaiz, C. Alcoberro Llivina 
Anita Blagojević: PROCEDURES REGARDING NATIONAL IDENTITY CLAUSE IN THE ... 211
despite its history and significance, there is no agreement what ‘’national identity’’ 
means or refers to. As a consequence, many questions still have no clear answers 
and remain quite unclear, such as: ‘’What exactly is national identity?’’, ‘’What 
does ‘identity’ means?’’, ‘’Who is allowed to identify national identity?’’, or ‘’Is 
there a difference between national and constitutional identity?’’.
Albeit the scope and meaning of the national identity seem quite unclear and un-
determined, academic literature has been all over the notion of national identity, 
especially after the Lisbon Treaty, which entered into force in December 2009, 
incorporated the so-called ‘’national identity clause’’ in Article 4(2) TEU and after 
the famous German Constitutional Court decision on the Lisbon Treaty of 30 
June 2009. 
According to Rideau, currently only three Member States of the European Union 
do explicitly endorse constitutional identity: Germany, France and Poland, the no-
tion is implied in Spain, Italy, Hungary and the Czech Republic, while this con-
cept is blurred or absent in the remaining Member States.3 One of this ‘’remaining 
Member States’’ is Republic of Croatia.
2. WHAT IS ACTUALLy ‘’NATIONAL IDENTITy’’?
Starting with the point that national identity is a concept far from being new and 
yet far from being clear, we may also add that is a concept far from being simple. 
We could also say that it is closely linked to terms ‘’identity’’ or ‘’constitutional 
identity’’, so close that it is ‘’common to use indiscriminately the terms ‘’national 
identity’’ and ‘’constitutional identity’’, because both refer to the same thing, con-
stitution or domestic law.’’4
The concept of national or constitutional identity has been addressed by many con-
stitutional lawyers, scholars, students. According to Rosenfeld, one of the leading 
American experts in the field, constitutional identity is ‘’an essentially contested 
concept as there is no agreement over what it means or refers to. Conceptions of 
constitutional identity range from focus on the actual features and provisions of a 
constitution – for example, does it establish a presidential or parliamentary system, 
a unitary or federal state – to the relation between the constitution and the culture 
(eds.)., National Constitutional Identity and European Integration, Intersentia, Cambridge – Antwerp 
– Portland, 2013, p. 109.
3  Rideau, J., The Case-law of the Polish, Hungarian and Czech Constitutional Courts on National Identity 
and the ‘German Model’, in: A. Saiz Arnaiz, C. Alcoberro Llivina (eds.)., National Constitutional Iden-
tity and European Integration op.cit. note 2, p. 243.
4  Flores Amaiquema, J. A., National Constitutional Identity in the European Union and the Principle of 
Primacy, LL.M. Final Thesis in Natural Resources and International Environmental Law, 2015, p. 77.
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in which it operates, and to the relation between the identity of the constitution 
and other relevant identities, such as national, religious, or ideological identity.’’5
In elaborating the idea of constitutional identity, Marti writes about several mean-
ings of the idea of constitutional identity: the identity of a constitutional text, the 
identity of a constitutional practice and tradition, the identity of the core values 
and principles of a constitution, the identity of the constitutional subject, the 
national identity, the (non-necessarily-national) identity of a political commu-
nity, the religious, ethnic and cultural identity of the whole society or of some 
subgroups in the society, etc. 6 Marti writes that all this different meanings can be 
restated to a basic distinction between two different ideas of constitutional iden-
tity: the identity of the constitution and the identity of the people.7 Additionally, 
Marti points out that ‘’the elements of the constitutional identity of a particular 
country are so fundamental that they should be specially preserved and protected 
from change. And that it is why they are often entrenched within the constitution 
itself.’’8
Smerdel writes that the core of the concept refers to certain principles of the na-
tional constitutions and that it can refer to different notions of ‘’identity’’: to what 
which essentially makes the constitution (and the state it governs) into what it is, 
and to what in which a constitution (and the states it governs) is different from 
some other constitutions. It might also mean the limits of the community author-
ity over the legal system of a Member State and in particular its constitution.9
Constitutional identity, according to Núňez Poblete, ‘’expresses some sort of me-
ta-constitution, understood as a set of norms or pre-constitutional principles that 
define the meaning of other constitutional norms, eventually coinciding, at a tex-
tual level, with other norms of different political communities.’’10
Besides the evolution of the concept of national identity through the work of 
scholars, a new era in the conceptualization of this concept came with the Lisbon 
Treaty and its so-called ‘’national identity clause’’ or the famous Article 4(2) TEU. 
5  Rosenfled, M., Constitutional Identity, in: M. Rosenfeld and A. Sajó (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of 
Comparative Constitutional Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012, p. 756.
6  Luis Marti, J., Two Different Ideas of Constitutional Identity: Identity of the Constitution v. Identity of the 
People, in: A. Saiz Arnaiz, C. Alcoberro Llivina (eds.)., National Constitutional Identity and European 
Integration, Intersentia, Cambridge – Antwerp – Portland, 2013, p. 19.
7  Ibid.
8  Ibid., p. 20.
9  Smerdel, B., In Quest of a Doctrine: Croatian Constitutional Identity in the European Union, Zbornik 
Pravnog fakulteta u Zagrebu, Vol. 64, No.4, 2014, p. 515.
10  quoted from: J. A. Flores Amaiquema op.cit. note. 4, p. 27.
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Having in mind that the obligation that exist for the EU to respect national iden-
tity of its Member States has its history before Article 4(2) TEU – namely, in Arti-
cle F(1) of the Maastricht Treaty (‘’The Union shall respect the national identities 
of its Member States, whose systems of government are founded on the principle 
of democracy.’’’11), and then in Article 6(3) of the Amsterdam Treaty (‘’The Un-
ion shall respect the national identities of its Member States.’’12) – we could say 
that Article 4(2) TEU is quite longer and more descriptive than its predecessors. 
Namely, Article 4(2) provides: ‘’The Union shall respect the equality of Member 
States before the Treaties as well as their national identities, inherent in their fun-
damental structures, political and constitutional, inclusive of regional and loal 
self-government. It shall respect their essential State functions, including ensuring 
the territorial integrity of the State, maintaining law and order and safeguarding 
national security. In particular, national security remains the sole responsibility of 
each Member State.’’13 
The link between national identity clause and the ‘’fundamental political and con-
stitutional structures’’, is the reason why we may say that this distances the notion 
of national identity in Article 4(2) TEU from cultural, historical or linguistic cri-
teria and turns to the content of national constitutional orders.14 In our view, this 
is the reason why we may understand the Article 4(2) TEU as national – repectively 
constitutional identity clause. This corresponds with the understanding of national 
identity introduced since 1970s by national constitutional courts who use nation-
al identity as constitutional, not cultural concept.15
Additionally, since earlier versions of the identity clause were not subject to the ju-
risdiction of the CJEU, this implies a great difference when it comes to comparing 
it to Lisbon Treaty which ‘’institutionally increases the importance of the identity 
clause and further develops its content’’.16
11 Treaty on European Union, available on: 
  URL=http://europa.eu/eu-law/decision_making/treaties/pdf/treaty_on:european_union/treaty_on_
european_union_en.pdf
12  Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the Europe-
an Communities and Certain Related Acts, URL=http://www.europarl.europa.eu/topics/treaty/pdf/
amst-en.pdf
13  Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union, 
  URL=http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12012M/TXT&from=EN
14  Von Bogdandy, A., Schill S., Overcoming Absolute Primacy: Respect for National Identity under the Lisbon 
Treaty, Common Market Law Review, Vol. 48, 2011, p. 1427.
15  Ibid.
16  Ibid., p. 1422.
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Since Article 4(2) TEU does not determine the national identity of Member 
States, there have been some controversies about such questions as to what the 
Union should respect, what this ‘’identity’’ precisely consist of, and who decides 
on the identity of Member States. However, Von Bogdandy and Schill write that 
although Article 4(2) TEU does not determine the national identity of Member 
States, ‘’it establishes, by referring to ‘fundamental political and constitutional 
structures, including regional and local self-government’, criteria for the elements 
and self-understandings that may be protected under Article 4(2) TEU. EU law 
therefore sets up criteria that can be of relevance for the notion of national iden-
tity under Article 4(2) TEU. Thus, only elements somehow enshrined in national 
constitutions or in domestic constitutional processes can be relevant for Article 
4(2) TEU.’’17
Without any doubt, this revised identity clause could be seen through the prism 
of a new era in the conceptualisation of the relationship between EU law and na-
tional law.18 According to Von Bogdany and Schill, it can help to reconceptualize 
the relationship between EU law and national constitutional law and ‘’guide the 
way to a more nuanced understanding beyond the categorical position of the ECJ 
on the one side, which supports the doctrine of absolute primacy of EU law even 
over the constitutional law of Member States, and that of most domestic consti-
tutional courts on the other, which largely follow a doctrine of relative primacy in 
accepting the primacy of EU law subject to certain constitutional limits.’’19
3.  DETERMINATION Of THE NATIONAL, RESPECTIVELy 
CONSTITUTIONAL IDENTITy
Since Article 4(2) TEU does not determine the national, respectively constitution-
al identity of Member States, we could say that there is no specific rule to follow 
to determine it. Accordingly, we could also say that of particular importance for 
determining the content of national constitutional identity are (relevant) constitu-
tional provisions, (relevant) national constitutional court’s case law and (relevant) 
CJEU’s case law.
3.1.1 Relevant constitutional provisions
In order to determine the content of constitutional identity of some Member 
State, our starting point should be its constitution, or, more precisely, certain 
17  Ibid., p. 1430.
18 Claes, M., op.cit note 2, p. 121.
19  Von Bogdany, A., Schild, S., op. cit. note 14, p. 1418.
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principles of its constitution or a set of core values, principles and rules. Almost 
all Member States of the EU enjoy a written Constitution, with the exception of 
the UK. Of course, not every constitutional element can be considered as part of 
the constitutional identity within the meaning of Article 4(2) TEU. This is why 
it is important to pay attention on constitutional provisions that prevent the leg-
islature from making certain constitutional changes or that subject constitutional 
amendments to a specifically difficult procedure.20
In its writing on methods of identification of national constitutional identity, 
Grewe writes that there are principally three conceptions of constitutional amend-
ments in European countries: (1) the substantial or material conception of the 
revision, that establishes a true hierarchy within the Constitution and that means 
that some provisions are excluded from any possibility of amendment (such as 
Article 79 paragraph 3 of the German Basic Law21 or Article 288 of the Portuguese 
Constitution22)23; (2) the procedural conception, that refers to a differentiation 
within the Constitution of two ways to amend the constitution, the total and 
the partial revision (such as the case with the three Baltic States, where the areas 
subjected to a total revision comprehend the first Chapter of the Constitution, 
in addition to the amendment provisions), and (3) the formal conception, that 
ignores any differentiation within the Constitution, so there is only one procedure 
for constitutional amendments and no provision is excluded from possible mod-
ification, and this is why in the framework of this conception is not possible to 
20  Ibid., p. 1432.
21  Article 79 paragrapf 3 of the German Basic Law: ‘’Amendment to this Basic Law affecting the division 
of the Federation into Länder, their participation on principle in the legislative process, or the princi-
ples lais down in Article 1 and 20 shall be inadmissible.’’
22  Article 288 of the Portuguesse Constitution: ‘’Constitutional revision laws shall respect: a. National 
independence and the unity of the state; b. The republican form of government; c. The separation 
between church and state; d. Citizens’ rights, freedoms and guarantees; e. The rights of workers, wor-
kers’ committees and trade unions; f. The coexistence of the public, private and cooperative and social 
sectors in relation to the ownership of the means of production; g. The requirement for economic 
plans, which shall exist within the framework of a mixed economy; h. The elected appointment of 
the officeholders of the bodies that exercise sovereign power, of the bodies of the autonomous regions 
and of local government bodies by universal, direct, secret and periodic suffrage; and the proportional 
representation system; i. Plural expression and political organisation, including political parties, and 
the right to democratic opposition; j. The separation and interdependence of the bodies that exercise 
sovereign power; l. The subjection of legal rules to a review of their positive constitutionality and of 
their unconstitutionality by omission; m. The independence of the courts; n. The autonomy of local 
authorities; o. The political and administrative autonomy of the Azores and Madeira archipelagos.
23  Beside Germany and Portugal, six other Member States of the EU prohibit certain amendments: Cy-
prus, the Czech Republic, France, Greece, Italy and Romania.
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draw any conclusion relating to the core of the Constitution (such as the case of 
Croatia24).25
In general, we may say that the principles that are constitutionally protected be-
long to the following categories: the protection of basic principles of State organ-
ization, State sovereignty and the principle of democracy, State symbols, State 
aims, the protection of human dignity, fundamental rights and the principle of 
law.26 
Additionally, in order to define constitutional core, it is important to examine 
the introductory provisions of Member States’ constitutions. Although the length 
and the style of preambles are quite varied, we may say that preambles have two 
principal functions. While the firts one consists of situating the Constitution in its 
time, the second one is interesting for the determination of constitutional identity 
because it consists of evoking the essence or the core of the Constitution.27 The 
content of the ‘’introductory part’’ of the Constitution – whether or not have been 
provided with a special title such as Preamble, General Principles, Fundamental 
Principles, or Historical Foundations in Croatian case – contains two different 
provisions: the first refer to the constitutive elements of the State in a large sense 
(institutional or ‘’sovereigntist’’ content) and the second address the constitution-
alism (constitutionalist or substantive content).28
If we choose to analyze the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia,29 which was 
adopted on 21 December 1990 and it has been repeatedly amended and adapted 
to the exigencies of the time (in 1997, 2000, 2001, 2010 and 2013), we may first-
ly say that, of course, not every constitutional element can be considered as part 
of the constitutional identity within the meaning of Article 4(2) TEU. This is why 
it is important to pay attention on constitutional provisions that prevent the leg-
islature from making certain constitutional changes or that subject constitutional 
amendments to a specifically difficult procedure. In this sense, it is important to 
note that Croatian Constitution is not one of those which contain prohibition 
of changing some of the constitutional norms. Consequently, this is why in the 
24  Beside Croatia, ten other Member States of the EU are implicated: Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxem-
burg, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Irelan, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia.
25  Grewe, C., Methods of Identifications of National Constitutional Identity, in: A. Saiz Arnaiz, C. Alcober-
ro Llivina (eds.)., National Constitutional Identity and European Integration, op.cit. note 2, pp. 40-44.
26  Von Bogdany, A., Schild S., op. cit. note 14, p. 1432.
27  Grewe, C., op.cit. note 25, p. 44.
28  Ibid., p. 45.
29  The Consitution of the Republic of Croatia - Ustav Republike Hrvatske, Oficial Gazette nos. 56/90, 
135/97, 113/00, 28/01, 76/10, 85/10 – consolidated text, 5/14 – Decision by the Constitutional 
Court of the Republic of Croatia
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framework of this formal conception is not possible to draw any conclusion re-
lating to the core of the Constitution. However, we agree with Kostadinov who 
strongly believe that nothing prevents us from finding this ‘’eternal clause’’ in the 
text of the Constitution. Here we share the opinion of Prof. Constance Grewe 
who stressed that ‘’nothing prevents us from finding the boundaries in the text, 
even if they are not explicitly deemed inviolable, and nothing prevents constitu-
tional judges to change their jurisprudence and to declare themselves entitled to 
protecting constitutional identity, even in the case of constitutional changes. Even 
if some legal system does not go as far as to determine the inviolable core of its 
Constitution, it will try to protect it because it represents its identity.’’30 
In this sense, we believe that constitutional identity of Croatia is determined in 
the constitutional text, more precisely – in three constitutional provisions and in 
Historical Foundations of the Constitution.
Firstly, at the beginning of constitutional text, Article 1 defines the Republic of 
Croatia as a unitary and indivisible democratic and social state, while Article 3 
establishes the highest values of the constitutional order of the Republic of Cro-
atia, as the grounds for the interpretation of the entire constitutional text as well 
as its institutional provisions. The list of eleven highest values – freedom, equal 
rights, national equality, equality of genders, love of peace, social justice, respect 
for human rights, inviolability of ownership, conservation of nature and the envi-
ronment, the rule of law and democratic multiparty system – certainly represents 
the list of fundamental constitutional principles which have priority over all other 
constitutional norms.31
Secondly, we stress Article 17 paragraphs 3 of the Constitution which stipulates 
that ‘’Not even in the case of an immediate threat to the existence of the State may 
restrictions be imposed on the application of the provisions of this Constitution con-
cerning the right to life, prohibition of torture, cruel or degrading treatment or punish-
ment, on the legal definitions of punishable offences and punishments, or on freedom 
of thought, conscience and religion.’’ According to Kostadinov, exactly this com-
pliance with the prohibition to limit the application of law, even in the cases of 
immediate threat to the existence of the State from Article 17, paragraph 3 of 
the Constitution, logically and theologically necessarily involves the inviolable 
30  Constance Grewe, lecture on 22eme Cours Internationale de Justice Constitutionnelle Hiérarchie en-
tre druits fondamentaux, Université Paul-Cézanne Aix-Marseille III, 8 and 9 September 2010, quoted 
from: Kostadinov, B., Constitutional Identity, Iustinianius Primus Law Review, Vol. 3:1, 2012, p. 16, 
URL=http://law-review.mk/pdf/04/biljana%20kostadinov.pdf
31  Smerdel, B., Ustavnost izmjena Ustavnog zakona o pravima manjina (NN 80/2010) i Zakona o izboru 
zastupnika (NN 145/2010), Političke analize, No. 8, 2011, p. 68.
EU AND COMPARATIVE LAW ISSUES AND CHALLENGES218
constitutional ban to annual those rights, and therefore the constitutional identity 
of the Republic of Croatia. This prohibition to limit the application and thus the 
annulment of the obligation to respect human dignity, the essence of the rule of 
law’s principles and the free democratic order is unalterable as a norm of Croatian 
Constitution.32 Since human rights can be limited by law in ordinary conditions 
(according to Article 16 of the Constitution33) and in extraordinary conditions 
(according to Article 17 paragraphs 1 and 234), this constitutional exemption via 
Article 17 paragraph 3 could be seen as the inviolable essence of the Constitution, 
or the material core of the Constitution, which is directed towards the protection 
of constitutional identity.
And finally, we stress the importance of the Historical Foundations of the Consti-
tution, or its preamble, which has great (primarily) historical, but also symbolic 
and political, significance. In the context of constitutional identity, we point out 
that its part on national sovereignty which states that ‘’...the Republic of Croatia is 
hereby founded and shall develop as a sovereign and democratic state in which equal-
ity, freedoms and human rights are guaranteed and ensured, and their economic and 
cultural progress and social welfare promoted.’’ This provision has served out as one 
of the most important grounds and guidelines for the interpretation of individual 
constitutional provisions and the Constitution as a whole.35 
3.2.  Relevant national constitutional courts’ case law
As a starting point in determination of the content of constitutional identity, the 
constitutional provisions only give a first indications. A second important phase in 
this sense is the relevant constitutional court’s case law. In this context, particularly 
32  Kostadinov, B., op.cit. note 30, p 17.
33  Acording to Article 16 of the Constitution, freedoms and rights may only be restricted by law in order 
to protect freedoms and rights of others, public order, public morality and health. Any restriction of 
freedoms and rights shall be proportional to the nature of the necessity for restriction in each individ-
ual case.
34  Article 17 paragraph 1 of the Constitution stipulates that individual constitutionally-guaranteed free-
doms and rights may be restricted during a state of war or any clear and present danger to the inde-
pendence and unity of the Republic of Croatia or in the event of any natural disaster. Such curtailment 
shall be decided upon by the Croatian Parliament by a two-thirds majority of all representatives or, if 
the Croatian Parliament is unable to convene, by the President of the Republic, at the proposal of the 
Government and upon the counter-signature of the Prime Minister. According to Article 17 paragraph 
2, the extent of such restrictions must be adequate to the nature of the threat, and may not result in the 
inequality of citizens with respect to race, colour, gender, language, religion, national or social origin.
35  Smerdel, B., The constitutional order of the Republic of Croatia on the twentieth anniversary of the ‘’Christ-
mas Constitution’’. The Constitution as a political and legal act, in: The Constitution of the Republic of 
Croatia, Novi informator, Zagreb, 2010, p. 95.
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important role play decisions regarding the relationship between the law of the 
European Union and domestic constitutional law.36 
According to Rideau, currently only three Member States of the European Union 
do explicitly endorse constitutional identity: Germany, France and Poland, the 
notion is implied in Spain, Italy, Hungary and the Czech Republic, while this 
concept is blurred or absent in the remaining Member States.37 
The beginnings of the development of the notion of constitutional identity in the 
constitutional courts’ case-law of respective Member States can be traced back to 
1970s. The German Federal Constitutional Court has developed the most elabo-
rate jurisprudence on constitutional identity. It referred to the concept of consti-
tutional identity for the first time in its 1974 Solange I38 decision and then later in 
a follow up judgment Solange II (1986). Whereas in the two Solange judgments 
the German Federal Constitutional Court had concentrated on the guarantees for 
the protection of fundamental rights in the Euro- pean (Economic) Community, 
in its 1993 Maastricht judgment it shifted its attention to institutional guarantees 
regarding the conferral of sovereign competences and the democratic legitimacy 
of EU action.39 The famous Lisbon judgement on the compatibility of the Treaty 
of Lisbon with the German Basic Law of 30 June 2009 ‘’proceeded with great im-
petus to the concretisation of the Constitution’s identity on which some positions 
adopted by the Court have relied until now’’.40 The Federal Constitutional Court 
reviewed whether the inviolable core content of the constitutional identity of the 
Basic Law (pursuant to Article 23.1 third sentence) in conjunction with Article 
79.3 of the Basic Law is respected. In this context, the Court held the following: 
‘’The exercise of this review power, which is rooted in constitutional law, follows 
the principle of the Basic Law’s openness towards European Law (Europarechtsfre-
undlichkeit), and it therefore also does not contradict the principle of sincere co-
operation (Article 4.3 Lisbon TEU); otherwise, with progressing integration, the 
fundamental political and constitutional structures of sovereign Member States, 
which are recognised by Article 4.2 first sentence Lisbon TEU, cannot be safe-
guarded in any other way. In this respect, the guarantee of national constitutional 
identity under constitutional and under Union law go hand in hand in the Euro-
pean legal area. The identity review makes it possible to examine whether due to 
the action of European institutions, the principles under Article 1 and Article 20 
36  Von Bogdany, A., Schild S., op. cit. note 14, p. 1433.
37  See note 3.
38  BverfGE, Judgement of 29 May 1974
39  Kiiver, P., The Lisbon Judgement of the German Constitutional Court: A Court-Ordered Strenghtening of 
the National Legislature in the EU, European Law Journal, Vol. 16, No. 5, 2010, p. 580.
40  Rideau, J., op.cit. note 3, p. 246.
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of the Basic Law, declared inviolable in Article 79.3 of the Basic Law, have been 
violated. This ensures that the primacy of application of Union law only applies 
by virtue and in the context of the constitutional empowerment that continues 
in effect.’’41 In this case the German Federal Constitutional Court explicitly made 
reference to Article 4(2) TEU and considered that Germany’s constitutional iden-
tity ‘’was defined by the so-called ‘eternity clause’ in Article 79(3) of the German 
Constitution’’,42 which, as mentioned previously, prevents the legislature from 
making certain changes to the German Basic Law. Additionally, it is important 
to note that besides the principles laid down in Articles 1 and 20 of the German 
Basic Law (in particular human dignity, democracy, rule of law, federalism), the 
Court mentioned eight further fields that are particularly relevant to constitution-
al identity: (1) citizenship, (2) the civil and the military monopoly on the use of 
force, (3) revenue and expenditure including external financing, (4) deprivation 
of liberty in the administration of criminal law or placement in an institution, (5) 
cultural issues, (6) the shaping circumstances concerning family and education, 
(7) the ordering of the freedom of opinion, press and of association, and (8) the 
dealing with the profession of faith or ideology.43 
This German approach has inspired the positions adopted by some other consti-
tutional courts. The French Constitutional Council, for example, started to use 
the concept of constitutional identity in its decision of 27 July 2006,44 when it 
reviewed the constitutionality of the Act pertaining to copyright and related rights 
in the information society and decided that ‘’the transposition of a Directive can-
not run counter to an rule or principle inherent to the constitutional identity of 
France, except when the onstituting power consents thereto.’’
With decision 1146/1988,45 the Italian Constitutional Court explicitly dealt with 
the problem of the existence of some supreme principles excluded from consti-
tutional revision. It explicitly determined that ‘’the Italian Constitution contains 
some supreme principles that cannot be subverted or changed in their essential 
content neither by constitutional laws of revision nor by constitutional laws. These 
41  BverfGE, Judgement of 30 June 2009, 2 BvE 2/08, at 240, URL=http://www.bverfg.de/e/es2009 
0630_2bve.00008en.html
42  Von Bogdany, A., Schild S., op. cit. note 14, p. 1438.
43  López Bofill, H. What is not Constitutional Pluralism in the EU, in: A. Saiz Arnaiz, C. Alcoberro Llivina 
(eds.)., National Constitutional Identity and European Integration, op.cit. note 2, p. 229.
44  Decision No. 2006-540 DC of 27 July 2006, URL=http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/con-
seil-constitutionnel/root/bank/download/2006540DCen2006_540dc.pdf
45  Decision of Italian Constitutional Court No. 2006-540 DC dated July 27th 2006, URL=http:// 
http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/root/bank/download/2006540D-
Cen2006_540dc.pdf
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principles are explicitly provided by the Constitution as absolute limits to power 
of constitutional revision, as the republican form of government (Art 139 of the 
Constitution) as well as the principles which, although not expressly mentioned 
among those not subject to the constitutional revision process, belong to the val-
ues upon which the Italian Constitution is founded.’’
The Spanish Constitutional Court in its Declaration 1/200446 addresses the is-
sue of the compatibility of the Spanish Constitution of 1978 and the Treaty of 
the European Union. The limits to the integration process were summarised as 
follows: ‘’These material limits, which are not expressly included in the constitu-
tional provision (Article 93), but which implicitly derive from the Constitution 
and from the essential meaning of the precept itself, are understood as respect for 
the sovereignty of the State, our basic constitutional structures and the system 
of fundamental principles and values established in our Constitution, in which 
fundamental rights acquire their own substantive nature’’. According to P. Pérez 
Tremps, thies brief formula provides the basis for ascertaining the content and 
scope of constitutional identity as defined by the Constitutional Court.47 In this 
sense, writes Pérez Tremps, constitutional identity includes a safeguard for the 
State itself, which encompasses two formally different contents: the essential ele-
ments of the State and the essential elements of the Constitution.48
The Polish Constitutional Court in its 24 November 2010 decision on the con-
stitutionality of the Lisbon Treaty,49 ‘’manifestly inspired by the German model 
to which it moreover openly refers’’,50 manifested its will to defend constitutional 
identity. The Constitutional Court shared the view expressed in the doctrine that 
the competences, under the prohibition of conferral, manifest about a constitu-
tional identity, and thus they reflect the values the Constitution is based on. There-
fore, ‘’constitutional identity is a concept which determines the scope of “excluding 
– from the competence to confer competences – the matters which constitute (...) 
‘the heart of the matter’, i.e. are fundamental to the basis of the political system of 
a given state” , the conferral of which would not be possible pursuant to Article 
46  Tribunal Constitutional 13.12.2004, Declaration 1/2004, available in English on URL=http://www.
tribunalconstitutional.es/es/jurisprudentia/restrad/Paginas/DTC122004en.aspx
47  Pérez Tremps, P., National Identity in Spanish Constitutional Court Case-law, in: A. Saiz Arnaiz, C. 
Alcoberro Llivina (eds.)., National Constitutional Identity and European Integration, op.cit. note 4, p. 
270.
48  Ibid.
49  Constitutional Court, Judgement of 24 November 2010 – Ref. No. K 32/09 (Constitutionality of the 
Lisbon Treaty), available on: URL=http://www.tribunal.gov.pl/eng/summaries/documents/K_32_09_
EN.pdf
50  Rideau, J., op.cit. note 3, p. 252.
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90 of the Constitution. Regardless of the difficulties related to setting a detailed 
catalogue of inalienable competences, the following should be included among the 
matters under the complete prohibition of conferral: decisions specifying the fun-
damental principles of the Constitution and decisions concerning the rights of the 
individual which determine the identity of the state, including, in particular, the 
requirement of protection of human dignity and constitutional rights, the principle 
of statehood, the principle of democratic governance, the principle of a state ruled 
by law, the principle 203 of social justice, the principle of subsidiarity, as well as 
the requirement of ensuring better implementation of constitutional values and the 
prohibition to confer the power to amend the Constitution and the competence 
to determine competences.’’ Thus, ‘’the guarantee of preserving the constitutional 
identity of the Republic of Poland has been Article 90 of the Constitution and the 
limits of conferral of competences specified therein.’’
The Hungarian Constitutional Court in its 20 July 2010 decision on the consti-
tutionality of the Act of promulgation of the Lisbon Treaty,51 interpreted the rele-
vant articles of the Constitution on sovereignty, democracy, rule of law and Euro-
pean cooperation. According to the Court, the so-called European clause cannot 
be interpreted in a way that would deprive the clauses on sovereignty and rule of 
law of their substance. The Court referred however to its former jurisprudence on 
the free limitation of the exercise of attributes of sovereignty by the holder of the 
sovereignty, i.e. in fact by the legislator. The Constitutional Court emphasized 
that material and procedural rules were duly observed during the adoption of the 
Act of promulgation and the Parliament gave its consent to the content of the 
Lisbon Treaty on its free will. To summarize, ‘’the Constitutional Court came to 
the conclusion that even if the reforms of the Lisbon Treaty were of paramount 
importance, they did not change the situation that Hungary maintains and enjoys 
her independence, her rule of law character and her sovereignty. Consequently, 
the application was rejected in all its elements.’’ 
The position of the Czech Constitutional Court on the constitutional identity is 
present in its decisions Lisbon I and Lisbon II. In its 2008 Lisbon I decision,52 the 
Constitutional Court examined a petition from the Senate of the Parliament of 
the Czech Republic, seeking review of whether the Treaty of Lisbon amending the 
Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community 
is consistent with the constitutional order of the Czech Republic. As regards the 
51  Constitutional Court, 20 July 2010, Decision 143/2010. (VII. 14.) AB of the Constitutional Court 
of the Republic of Hungary on the constitutionality of the Act on promulgation of the Lisbon Treaty, 
Press release in English, available on URL=http://www.mkab.hu/admin/data/file/797_143_2010.pdf
52  Constitutional Court, 2008/11/26 – Pl. US 19/08: Treaty of Lisbon, available on URL=http://www.
usoud.cz/en/decisions/20081126-pl-us-1908-treaty-of-lisbon-i-I
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sixth group of the Senate’s objections (the Senate questioned whether Art. 2 of 
the TEU is consistent with Art. 1 par. 1 and Art. 2 par. 1 of the Constitution (the 
principle of the sovereignty of the people), ‘’the Constitutional Court stated that 
the values mentioned in Art. 2 and 7 of the TEU are fundamentally consistent 
with the values on which the material core of the Czech constitution rests (cf. Art. 
1 par. 1, Art. 5, Art. 6 of the Constitution, Art. 1, Art. 2 par. 1, Art. 3, Chapter 
Four of the CFRF). Therefore, in this regard as well the Treaty of Lisbon is consist-
ent with the untouchable principles protected by the Czech constitutional order. 
Insofar as the Senate relies on state sovereignty in this regard, the Constitutional 
Court stated that in a modern, democratic state, governed by the rule of law, state 
sovereignty is not an aim in and of itself, in isolation, but is a means for fulfilling 
the fundamental values on which the construction of a constitutional state gov-
erned by the rule of law, stands. Therefore, the Constitutional Court summarized 
that the Treaty of Lisbon changes nothing on the fundamental concept of current 
European integration, and that, even after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lis-
bon, the Union would remain a unique organization of an international law char-
acter.’’ Accordingly, we may say that the Czech Constitutional Court considered 
the rule of law (Article 1(1) of the Constitution, free competition among political 
parties (Article 5 of the Constitution), the principle of non-discrimination (and 
protection of national minorities (Art 2 and 3 of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights and Basic Freedoms) as part of the constitutional core. A year later, in 
its 3 November 2009 Lisbon II decision,53 the Constitutional Court examined a 
petition from a group of senators of the Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Re-
public for review of the Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union 
and the Treaty establishing the European Community for conformity with the 
constitutional order. The Constitutional Court did not consider itself authorised 
to establish material limits to the transfer of competences: ‘’However, the Consti-
tutional Court does not consider it possible, in view of the position that it holds 
in the constitutional system of the Czech Republic, to create such a catalogue of 
non-transferrable powers and authoritatively determine “substantive limits to the 
transfer of powers”, as the petitioners request. It points out that it already stated, 
in judgment Pl. ÚS 19/08, that “These limits should be left primarily to the leg-
islature to specify, because this is a priori a political question, which provides the 
legislature wide discretion.” Responsibility for these political decisions cannot be 
transferred to the Constitutional Court; it can review them only at the point when 
they have actually been made on the political level. For the same reasons, the Con-
stitutional Court does not feel authorised to formulate in advance, in an abstract 
53  Constitutional Court, 2009/11/03 – Pl. US 29/09: Treaty of Lisbon II, available on URL=http://www.
usoud.cz/en/decision/20091103-pl-us-2909-treaty-of-lisbon-ii-1.
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context, what is the precise content of Article 1(1) of the Constitution, as request-
ed by the petitioners, supported by the president, who welcomes the attempt “in a 
final list to define the elements of the ‘material core’ of the constitutional order, or 
more precisely, of a sovereign democratic state governed by the rule of law”, and 
states (in agreement with the petitioners) that this could “limit future self-serving 
definition of these elements based on cases being adjudicated at the time.”
This brief overview of national constitutional courts case-law demonstrates fol-
lowing: first, the German Federal Constitutional Court has developed the most 
elaborate jurisprudence on the constitutional identity and the judgements of this 
Court seem to serve as a reference point for other constitutional courts in Europe; 
second, this is the reason why – despite some differences in the jurisprudence of 
national constitutional courts – we may see a ‘’remarkable overall convergence’’,54 
and third, most of these constitutional courts have developed certain constitution-
al limits with regard to the protection of the statehood, the protection of the form 
of government and of the central principles of State organization, the protection 
of democracy, of the rule of law and, of course, of fundamental rights.55
With regard to the Republic of Croatia, in the case law of the Constitutional 
Court of the Republic of Croatia reference to constitutional identity has appeared 
and discussed only recently. First reference of the Croatian Constitutional Court 
to constitutional identity can be found in its Decision U-I-3597/2010 et al., from 
July 2011,56 where the Court states that the constitutional identity of the Republic 
of Croatia is determined in paragraph 2 of the Historical Foundations of the Con-
stitution: ‘’…the Republic of Croatia is established as the national state of the Croa-
tian people and the state of the members of national minorities: Serbs, Czechs, Slovaks, 
Italians, Hungarians, Jews, Germans, Austrian, Ukrainians, Ruthenians, Bosniaks, 
Slovenians, Montenegrins, Turks, Vlachs, Albanians and others, who are its citizens, 
who are guaranteed equality with citizens of the Croatian nationality and the realisa-
tion of national rights in accordance with the democratic norms of the UN and the 
lands of the free world.’’ This principle of equality of members of national minori-
ties with citizens of the Croatian nationality as a part of Croatian constitutional 
54  Von Bogdany, A., Schild S., op. cit. note 14,  p. 1433.
55  Ibid., p. 1440.
56  Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia, Nos. U-I-3597/2010, U-I-
3847/2010, U-I-692/2011, U-I-898/2011, U-I-994/2011, Zagreb, 29 July 2011, point 
30.1, availabe on: URL=http://  http://sljeme.usud.hr/usud/praksWen.nsf/e540ceb6cd1e4ec-
0c1257de1004aa1f3/477e6dbf66aeaa69c1257e5f003d81f8/$FILE/U-I-3597-2010.pdf. In this case 
proceedings have been instituted to review conformity with the Constitution and Article 1 of the 
Constitutional Act on Amendments to the Constitutional Act on the Rights of National Minorities. 
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identity was certainly a first step towards the Croatian theory of constitutional 
identity.
A second important step has been made two years later in the framework of Con-
stitutional Court Communication on the citizen’s constitutional referendum on 
the definition of marriage.57 This Communication was issued on the occacion of 
the citizens’ initiative “In the Name of the Family” (U ime obitelji) of mid 2013 
requesting the calling of a national referendum to amend the Constitution of 
the Republic of Croatia whereby the definition of marriage as a living union be-
tween a man and a woman would be introduced into the Constitution.58 In the 
case of the referendum on the definition of marriage, voting was conducted and 
a decision rendered in the Croatian Parliament to dismiss the proposal for the 
Croatian Parliament to act on Article 95 of the Constitutional Act on the Con-
stitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia59 (acording to which at the request 
of the Croatian Parliament, the Constitutional Court shall, in the case when ten 
percent of the total number of voters in the Republic of Croatia request calling 
a referendum, establish whether the question of the referendum is in accordance 
with the Constitution and whether the requirements in Article 8 paragraphs 1-3 
of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia for calling a referendum have been 
met) and file a request with the Constitutional Court on those two questions. By 
rendering a decision to dismiss the proposal for the Croatian Parliament to act 
on Article 95 of the Constitutional Act, the Croatian Parliament expressed its 
legal will that it deemed the content of the referendum question on the defini-
tion of marriage to be in conformity with the Constitution and confirmed that 
the constitutional requirements had been met to call a referendum on that ques-
tion. However, pursuant to Article 125.9 of the Constitution and Article 2.1 in 
conjunction with Article 87.2 of the Constitutional Act, the Constitutional Court 
has the general constitutional task to guarantee respect of the Constitution and 
to oversee the conformity of a national referendum with the Constitution, right 
up to the formal conclusion of the referendum procedure. Accordingly, after the 
Croatian Parliament had rendered a decision to call a national referendum on 
the basis of a citizens’ constitutional initiative, and it had not prior to that acted 
57  Constitutional Court, Communication on the citizens’s constitutional referendum on the definition of 
marriage, No. SuS-1/2013, Zagreb, 14 November 2013, 
  availabe on:  URL=http:// sljeme.usud.hr/usud/prakswen.nsf/.../$FILE/SuS-1-2013.doc.
58  The national referendum was requested by 683,948 voters, that is more than 10 percent of the total 
number of voters in the Republic of Croatia, At its session held on 8 November 2013, the Croatian 
Parliament adopted the Decision to call a national referendum, which was published in the Official 
Gazette no. 134 of 9 November 2013, and came into force on the day it was adopted.
59  Constitutional Act on the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia, consolidated text, Official 
Gazette No. 49/02.
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on Article 95.1 of the Constitutional Act, the Constitutional Court’s general su-
pervisory authority over the conformity with the Constitution of a referendum 
called in this way does not ceased. However, out of respect for the constitutional 
role of the Croatian Parliament as the highest legislative and representative body 
in the state, the Constitutional Court believed that it is only permissible to make 
use of its general supervisory authorities in that situation as an exception, when 
it establishes the formal and/or substantive unconstitutionality of a referendum 
question, or a procedural error of such severity that it threatens to destroy the 
structural characteristics of the Croatian constitutional state, that is, its constitu-
tional identity, including the highest values of the constitutional order of the Re-
public of Croatia (Articles 1 and 3 of the Constitution). The primary protection 
of those values does not exclude the authority of the framer of the Constitution 
to expressly exclude some other question from the circle of permitted referendum 
questions (point 5 of the Communication).
It is interesting that other Constitutional Courts’ reflections on constitutional 
identity can be found in some other cases connected with the citizen-initiated 
referendum.
In this context, also in 2013 the citizens’ initiative ‘’Headquarters for the De-
fence of Croatian Vukovar’’ (‘’Stožer za obranu hrvatskog Vukovara’’) succeeded in 
collecting the necessary number of signatures for the referendum to amend the 
Constitutional Act on the Right of National Minorities.60 More precisely, the aim 
was to change minority language rights in the sense that existed provision (Article 
12 of the Consitutional Act) ‘’equal official use of the language and script used 
by members of a national minority shall be realised in the area of a unit of local 
self-government when members of an individual national minority comprise at 
least one third of the population of such unit” change to ‘’at least one half’’ of the 
population of such unit. At the request of the Croatian Parliament, the Consti-
tutional Court decided in its Decision U-VIIR-4640/201461 that the referendum 
question was constitutionally inadmissible. For us is interesting point 13.1 of the 
respective Decision, which states that ‘’Article 12.2 of the Constitution should 
be understood as a public law expression of the particular importance which the 
Constitution gives to the language and script of national minorities, these univer-
sal and permanent values which define the identity of the Croatian constitutional 
state.’’ Exactly this declaration - that the respect for minority languages makes part 
60  Constitutional Act on the Rights of National Minorities, Official Gazette nos. 155/02, 47/10 – de-
cision by the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia, 80/10 and 93/11 - decision by the 
Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia
61  Decision of the Constitutional Court, No U-VIIR-4640/2014, Zagreb, 12 August 2014
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of the Croatian constitutional identity – was one of the most prominent features 
of this case.
In 2014, two more citizens’ initiative by several trade unions (the first one de-
manded a referendum on preventing the outsourcing of non-core services in the 
public sector, while the second one demanded a referendum against the mone-
tisation of the Croatian motorways) also succeeded in collecting the necessary 
number of signatures, but the Constitutional Court decided that respective ref-
erendums questions were (also) constitutionally inadmissible. In first case con-
cerning the outsourcing,62 the Court has repeated its statement from point 5 of 
the Communication on the citizen’s constitutional referendum on the definition 
of marriage and stated that whith regard to the revision of the Constitution, it is 
the obligation of the Constitional Court to permit referendum ‘’when it establishes 
the formal and/or substantive unconstitutionality of a referendum question, or a pro-
cedural error of such severity that it threatens to destroy the structural characteristics of 
the Croatian constitutional state, that is, its constitutional identity, including the high-
est values of the constitutional order of the Republic of Croatia (Articles 1 and 3 of the 
Constitution)’’ (point 34.4.). In second case concerning the monetisation of Croa-
tian motorways,63 the Court declared that constitutional principle from Article 
49 paragraph 1 of the Constitution, which states that entrepreneurial and market 
freedom shall be the basis of the economic system of the Republic of Croatia, and 
which must be seen together with the Article 3 of the Constitution, is especially 
linked to the conception of constitutionally guaranteed fundamental rights which 
builds the identity of Croatian constitutional state (poin 43.1.). 
To sum up: in the case law of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Cro-
atia reference to constitutional identity has appeared and discussed only recently 
and the Court has defined following parts of the Croatian constitutional identity: 
first, Article 1 and Article 3 of the Constitution (the highest values of the con-
stitutional order of the Republic of Croatia); second, constitutionally guaranteed 
fundamental rights, including respect for minority languages and entrepreneurial 
and market freedom, and third, the Historical Foundation of the Constitution, 
especially its paragraph 2 on equality of national minorities with citizens of the 
Croatian nationality.
On the other hand, as to the identity clause and as to the subsidiarity of the EU 
law in Croatian legal order in general, there is still no relevant case-law of the 
Croatian Constitutional Court. However, according to the former President of 
62  Decision of the Constitutional Court, No. U-VIIR-1159/2015, Zagreb, 8 April 2015
63  Decision of the Constitutional Court, No. U-VIIR-1158/2015, Zagreb, 21 April 2015
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the Croatian Constitutional Court Jasna Omejec, it is reasonable to presume that 
the relevant legal standpoints of the German Federal Constitutional Court will be 
carefully considered by the Croatian Constitutional Court in the coming period. 
This is primarily related to the ‘’standpoints of the German BVerfG that is obliged 
to intervene if a measure under EU law were to represent a clear or structurally 
significant ultra vires act, or if it were detrimental to Germany’s constitutional 
identity as protected under Article 79.3 of the Basic Law, including the minimum 
standard of protection of fundamental rights demanded by the Basic Law.’’64 
Consequently, the Croatian Constitutional Court will, in the coming period, have 
to define the fundamental meaning of the subsidiarity of the EU law in the Croa-
tian constitutional order and also clearly define its constitutional identity. This has 
not been done to date. Concerning the constitutional basis of Croatian Constitu-
tions’ supremacy over EU law, it would not be hard to construe it by an objective 
interpretation – there is Article 2 of the Constitution (‘’The sovereignty of the Re-
public of Croatia is inalienable, indivisible and non-transferable’’), Article 3 of the 
Constitution (the highest values of the constitutional order) and Article 5 of the 
Constitution (‘’In the Republic of Croatia laws shall conform to the Constitution, 
and other rules and regulations shall conform to the Constitution and law’’). The 
EU derives its democratic legitimacy in Croatia within the meaning of Articles 
143-146 of the Constitution (‘’European Union Law’’) in connection with Article 
1 of the Constitution (‘’The Republic of Croatia is a unitary and indivisible demo-
cratic and social state. Power in the Republic of Croatia derives from the people 
and belongs to the people as a community of free and equal citizens. The people 
shall exercise this power through the election of representatives and through direct 
decision making’’). Therefore, according to Omejec, ‘’the Constitutional Court 
could see itself as being obliged to monitor at least those actions that arbitrarily 
exceed the limits of the EU programme of integration, that is, the constitutional 
powers transferred to the EU, and, if necessary, to find such legal acts to be inap-
plicable in Croatia.’’65 Until now the Constitutional Court has issued only one 
general legal standpoint concerning EU law. Namely, in the mentioned 2015 De-
cision on the monetization of Croatia motorways, the Court first established that 
a proposed Act on Amendments to the Roads Act was not in conformity with the 
Constitution and subsequently concluded that it was necessary to further review 
the conformity of referendum question with EU law in substance ‘’because the 
Constitution by its own legal force has supremacy over EU law’’ (point 60.). 
64  Omejec, J., Study on European Constitutional Courts as the Courts of Human Rights. Assessment, chal-
lenges, perspectives, Zagreb, 2016, p. 26, URL=http:// bib.irb.hr/datoteka/796420.OMEJEC_-_Euro-
pean_Constitutional_Courts_as_the_Courts_of_Human_Rights.pdf
65  Ibid., p. 27.
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Having all this in mind, we strongly hope that Croatian Constitutional Court will 
actively participate in European constitutional pluralism exactly via constitutional 
protection of Croatian constitutional identity.
3.3.  Relevant case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union
Although the CJEU made a reference to the notion of national identity even before 
the Lisbon Treaty (for example, the notion of national identity was mentioned in 
several opinions of advocates general,66 but in all of these cases ‘’ reference was to 
the protection of the national cultural identity of the relevant States rather than 
to the more political form of it’’67), the case Sayn-Wittgenstein68 was the first that 
cited Article 4(2) TEU in relationship with primary law (in this case Article 21 
TFEU) and national law (in this case Law on the Abolition of the Nobility). The 
case concerned the question whether the decision of Austrian authorities to change 
the surname of Austrian citizen residing in Germany (on the ground of the Law 
on the Abolition of the Nobility) from ‘’Fürstin von Sayn-Wittgenstein’’ (‘’Prin-
cess of Sayn-Wittgenstein) into ‘’Sayn-Wittgenstein’’ was in breach of Article 21 
TFEU. While the Austrian Government has pointed out that ‘’the provisions at 
issue in the main proceedings are intended to protect the constitutional identity 
of the Republic of Austria. The Law on the abolition of the nobility, even if it is 
not an element of the republican principle which underlies the Federal Constitu-
tional Law, constitutes a fundamental decision in favour of the formal equality of 
treatment of all citizens before the law’’, the ECJ found that ‘’the refusal, by the 
66  For example, Advocate General Maduro was one of the first to remark pre-Lisbon in Spain v. Eurojust 
(2005) and later in Michinaki case (2008). In Spain v. Eurojust, Maduro informs that ‘’In a Union 
intended to be an area of freedom, security and justice, in which it is sought to establish a society cha-
racterised by pluralism, respect for linguistic diversity is of fundamental importance. That is an aspect 
of the respect which the Union owes, in the terms of Article 6(3) EU, to the national identities of the 
Member States’’ and that ‘’language is not merely a functional means of social communication. It is 
an essential attribute of personal identity and, at the same time, a fundamental component of national 
identity.’’ (Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro delievered on 16 December 2004, avai-
lable on: URL=http://curia.europa.eu/juris/showPdf.jsf?docid=49769&doclang=EN). In Michinaki 
case, Advocate General Maduro points that ‘’even in cases that fall within their scope, the provisions 
on freedom of movement do not replace domestic law as the relevant normative framework for the 
assessment of conflicts between private actors. Instead, Member States are free to regulate private con-
duct as long as they respect the boundaries set by Community law.’’ (Opinion of Advocate General 
Poiares Maduro delievered on 23 May 2007, available on: URL=http://curia.europa.eu/juris/showPdf.
jsf?docid=62533&doclang=en). We may see that in the first mentioned case it is stated that respect to 
national identity can be employed on grounds on nationality, while in the second as a means of dero-
gating from EU free movement provisions.
67  Claes, M., op.cit. note 2, p. 130.
68  Case C-208/09 Sayn-Wittgenstein [2010] ECLI:EU:C:2010:806,  availabe on: URL=http://curia.eu-
ropa.eu/juris/celex.jsf?celex=62009CJ0208&lang1=en&type=TXT&ancre=
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authorities of a Member State, to recognise all the elements of the surname of a 
national of that State, as determined in another Member State – in which that 
national resides – at the time of his or her adoption as an adult by a national of 
that other Member State, where that surname includes a title of nobility which 
is not permitted in the first Member State under its constitutional law cannot be 
regarded as a measure unjustifiably undermining the freedom to move and reside 
enjoyed by citizens of the Union.’’ The ECJ held that measures which restrict a 
fundamental freedom may be justified on public policy grounds only if they are 
necessary for the protection of the interests which they are intended to secure and 
only in so far as those objectives cannot be attained by less restrictive measures. 
The ECJ also accepted that, in the context of Austrian constitutional history, the 
Law on the abolition of the nobility, as an element of national identity, may be 
taken into consideration when a balance is struck between legitimate interests and 
the right of free movement of persons recognised under European Union law. In 
this context, the Court has interpreted the constitutional background of the Law 
in questions as an element of Austria’s public policy and stressed that ‘’the concept 
of public policy as justification for a derogation from a fundamental freedom must 
be interpreted strictly, so that its scope cannot be determined unilaterally by each 
Member State without any control by the European Union institutions’’. Finally, 
in order to clarify the concept of public policy as a justification for restrictions 
of fundamental freedoms guaranteed in the EU law, the ECJ also pointed out 
that ‘’in accordance with Article 4(2) TEU, the European Union is to respect the 
national identities of its Member States, which include the status of the State as 
a Republic.’’ As emphasized by Von Bogdany and Schill, this case helps to clarify 
the understanding of Article 4(2) TEU in following ways: ‘’First, the ECJ noted 
the connection between the concept of national identity and the constitutional 
background of the interests that Austria’s measures protected. Second, the ECJ 
held that the status of the State as a republic formed part of national identity, thus 
intensifying the nexus between national identity and fundamental constitutional 
principles. Finally, the Court embedded the respect for national identity in the 
present proceedings into its general jurisprudence on the relationship between 
fundamental freedoms and fundamental rights.’’69
Explicit mention of Article 4(2) TEU has been also made in case Malgožata Rune-
vič-Vardyn,70 that concerned a Lithuanian national (first applicant), member of the 
Polish minority (with Polish forename ‘’Małgorzata’’ and surname ‘’Runiewicz’’), 
69  Von Bogdany, A., Schild S., op. cit. note 14, p. 1425.
70  Case C-391/09, Malgožata Runevič-Vardy [2011] ECLI:EU:C:2011:291,
  available on: URL=http://curia.europa.eu/juris/celex.jsf?celex=62009CJ0391&lang1=en&type=TX-
T&ancre=
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married to a Polish national (second applicant) who complained, after the refusal 
of the Vilnius Civil Registry Division to change her forename and surname, as 
they appear on her birth certificate, namely ‘’Malgožata Runevič’’, to be changed 
to ‘’Małgorzata Runiewicz’’,  that there had been discrimination on the grounds of 
race and invoked the enforcement of Article 21 TFEU and the Directive 2000/43. 
According to the Lithuanian Law, entries on certificates of civil status must be 
made in Lithuanian. Forenames, surnames and place names must be written in 
accordance with the rules of the Lithuanian language. ( Article 3.282 of the Civil 
Code) and this rule has been confirmed by the Lithuanian Constitutional Court – 
this Court declared that a person’s forename and surname had to be entered on a 
passport in accordance with the rules governing the spelling of the official national 
language in order not to undermine the constitutional status of that language. In 
this case the ECJ states that ‘’it is legitimate for a Member State to ensure that 
the official national language is protected in order to safeguard national unity and 
preserve social cohesion. The Lithuanian Government stresses, in particular, that 
the Lithuanian language constitutes a constitutional asset which preserves the na-
tion’s identity, contributes to the integration of citizens, and ensures the expression 
of national sovereignty, the indivisibility of the State, and the proper functioning 
of the services of the State and the local authorities.’’ We may see that the Court 
has expressly relied on Article 4(2) TEU and affirmed that the EU should respect 
national identity of its Member States, which includes protection of a State’s of-
ficial national language. The Court also stressed that this objective pursued by 
national rules constitutes, in principle, ‘’a legitimate objective capable of justifying 
restrictions on the rights of freedom of movement and residence provided for in 
Article 21 TFEU and may be taken into account when legitimate interests are 
weighed against the rights conferred by European Union law. Measures which re-
strict a fundamental freedom, such as that provided for in Article 21 TFEU, may, 
however, be justified by objective considerations only if they are necessary for the 
protection of the interests which they are intended to secure and only in so far as 
those objectives cannot be attained by less restrictive measures.’’
Another interesting case concerning Article 4(2) TEU is case O’Brien,71 concern-
ing the refusal of the Ministry of Justice to pay Mr. O’Brien (queen’s Council and 
former Crown Court recorder) a retirement pension calculated pro rata temporis 
on the retirement pension payable to a full-time judge taking retirement at age 65 
which has performed the same work. In this case some important questions were 
raised: first, who define the concept of workers who have on employment contract 
71  Case C-393/10, O’Brien [2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:110,
  available on: URL=http://curia.europa.eu/juris/celex.jsf?celex=62010CJ0393&lang1=en&type=TX-
T&ancre=
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or an employment relationship and who determine whether judges fall within 
that concept – and here the ECJ emphasized that ‘’ it is for the Member States to 
define the concept of ‘workers who have an employment contract or an employ-
ment relationship’ in Clause 2.1 of the Framework Agreement on part-time work 
and, in particular, to determine whether judges fall within that concept, subject to 
the condition that that does not lead to the arbitrary exclusion of that category of 
persons from the protection offered by Directive 97/81 and that framework agree-
ment. An exclusion from that protection may be permitted only if the relationship 
between judges and the Ministry of Justice is, by its nature, substantially different 
from that between employers and their employees falling, according to national 
law, within the category of workers’’, and second, if according to national law, 
judges fall within the concept of ‘’workers who have an employment contract or 
an employment relationship’’ in Clause 2.1 of the Framework Agreement on part-
time work, whether the latter must be interpreted as meaning that it precludes, 
for the purpose of access to the retirement pension scheme, national law from 
discriminating between full- and part-time judges, or between different kinds of 
part-time judges - the ECJ answered that the Framework Agreement on part-time 
work must be interpreted as meaning that it precludes, for the purpose of access 
to the retirement pension scheme, national law from establishing a distinction be-
tween full-time judges and part-time judges remunerated on a daily fee-paid basis, 
unless such a difference in treatment is justified by objective reasons, which is a 
matter for the referring court to determine. The ECJ also argued on the argument 
of Latvian Government (intervening in the case) that the application of European 
Union law to the judiciary has the result that the national identities of the Mem-
ber States are not respected, contrary to Article 4(2) TEU. The Court held that the 
application, with respect to part-time judges remunerated on a daily fee-paid ba-
sis, of Directive 97/81 and the Framework Agreement on part-time work cannot 
have any effect on national identity, but merely aims to extend to those judges the 
scope of the principle of equal treatment, which constitutes one of the objectives 
of those acts, and to protect them against discrimination as compared with full-
time workers. Accordingly, in this case we have seen that Article 4(2) TEU can be 
used by by various actors, not only by the parties in the proceeding, but also by 
the intervening parties.
As it arises from the above analysis of the CJEU’s case-law, although it seems that 
Article 4(2) TEU offers a trap door to Member States to escape some of their EU 
law obligations, the overall picture is far from being so simple. It is obvious that 
Member States should be allowed some kind of discretion to develop the concept 
of constitutional identity, especially because, as it was stressed is Sayn-Wittgenstein, 
‘’the specific circumstances which may justify recourse to the concept of public 
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policy may vary from one Member State to another and from one era to another’’. 
However, the Court has repeatedly noted that the concept of public policy as justi-
fication for a derogation from a fundamental freedom must be interpreted strictly, 
so that its scope cannot be determined unilaterally by each Member State without 
any control by the European Union institutions.
4. CONCLUSION
Besides the evolution of the concept of national identity through the work of 
scholars, a new era in the conceptualization of this concept came with the Lisbon 
Treaty and its so-called ‘’national identity clause’’ or the famous Article 4(2) TEU. 
Having in mind that the obligation that exist for the EU to respect national iden-
tity of its Member States have its history before Article 4(2) TEU, we could say 
that Article 4(2) TEU is quite longer and more descriptive than its predecessors. 
Namely, Article 4(2) provides: ‘’The Union shall respect the equality of Member 
States before the Treaties as well as their national identities, inherent in their fun-
damental structures, political and constitutional, inclusive of regional and loal 
self-government. It shall respect their essential State functions, including ensuring 
the territorial integrity of the State, maintaining law and order and safeguarding 
national security. In particular, national security remains the sole responsibility of 
each Member State.’’
Since Article 4(2) TEU does not determine the national identity of Member States, 
we could say that there is no specific rule to follow to determine it. Accordingly, 
we could also say that of particular importance for determining the content of 
constitutional identity are (relevant) constitutional provisions, (relevant) national 
constitutional court’s case law and (relevant) ECJ’s case law.
In order to determine the content of constitutional identity of some Member 
State, our starting point should be its constitution, or, more precisely, certain 
principles of its constitution or a set of core values, principles and rules. In general, 
we may say that the principles that are constitutionally protected belong to the 
following categories: the protection of basic principles of State organization, State 
sovereignty and the principle of democracy, State symbols, State aims, the protec-
tion of human dignity, fundamental rights and the principle of law.
As a starting point in determination of the content of constitutional identity, the 
constitutional provisions only give a first indications. A second important phase in 
this sense is the relevant constitutional court’s case law. In this context, particularly 
important role play decisions regarding the relationship between the law of the 
European Union and domestic constitutional law. The German Federal Consti-
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tutional Court has developed the most elaborate jurisprudence on constitutional 
identity. This German approach has inspired the positions adopted by some other 
constitutional courts, and very possible will be also inspiration for future Croatian 
Constitutional Court position in this context.
As it arises from the analysis of the CJEU’s case-law, although it seems that Ar-
ticle 4(2) TEU offers a trap door to Member States to escape some of their EU 
law obligations, the overall picture is far from being so simple. It is obvious that 
Member States should be allowed some kind of discretion to develop the concept 
of constitutional identity, especially because, as it was stressed is Sayn-Wittgenstein, 
‘’the specific circumstances which may justify recourse to the concept of public 
policy may vary from one Member State to another and from one era to another’’. 
However, the Court has repeatedly noted that the concept of public policy as justi-
fication for a derogation from a fundamental freedom must be interpreted strictly, 
so that its scope cannot be determined unilaterally by each Member State without 
any control by the European Union institutions.
In order to determine Croatian constitutional identity, our starting point was the 
Constitution of the Republic of Croatia. Having in mind that Croatian Constitu-
tion is not one of those which contain prohibition of changing some of the consti-
tutional norms, and this is why in the framework of this formal conception is not 
possible to draw any conclusion relating to the core of the Constitution, we stress 
that constitutional identity of Croatia is determined in the constitutional text, 
more precisely – in three constitutional provisions and in Historical Foundations 
of the Constitution. Firstly, we stress Article 17 paragraph 3 of the Constitution 
which stipulates that ‘’Not even in the case of an immediate threat to the existence 
of the State may restrictions be imposed on the application of the provisions of this 
Constitution concerning the right to life, prohibition of torture, cruel or degrading 
treatment or punishment, on the legal definitions of punishable offences and punish-
ments, or on freedom of thought, conscience and religion.’’ Secondly, at the beginning 
of constitutional text, Article 3 establishes the highest values of the constitutional 
order of the Republic of Croatia, as the grounds for the interpretation of the entire 
constitutional text as well as its institutional provisions. And finally, we stress the 
importance of the Historical Foundations of the Constitution, or its preamble, 
which has great (primarily) historical, but also symbolic and political, significance.
On the other hand, in the case law of the Constitutional Court of the Republic 
of Croatia reference to constitutional identity has appeared and discussed only re-
cently. The Court has defined following parts of the Croatian constitutional iden-
tity: first, Article 1 and Article 3 of the Constitution (the highest values of the con-
stitutional order of the Republic of Croatia); second, constitutionally guaranteed 
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fundamental rights, including respect for minority languages and entrepreneurial 
and market freedom, and third, the Historical Foundation of the Constitution, 
especially its paragraph 2 on equality of national minorities with citizens of the 
Croatian nationality. 
As to the identity clause and as to the subsidiarity of the EU law in Croatian legal 
order in general, there is still no relevant case-law of the Croatian Constitutional 
Court. However, according to the former President of the Croatian Constitutional 
Court Jasna Omejec, it is reasonable to presume that the relevant legal standpoints 
of the German Federal Constitutional Court, including on constitutional identity 
issue, will be carefully considered by the Croatian Constitutional Court in the 
coming period. 
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